To get to grips with what Shapiro does and can say about higher-order vagueness, it is first necessary to thoroughly review and evaluate his conception of (first-order) vagueness, a conception which is both rich and suggestive but, as it turns out, not so easy to stabilise. In Sections I–IV, his basic position on vagueness (see Shapiro [2003]) is outlined and assessed. As we go along, I offer some suggestions for improvement. In Sections V–VI, I review two key paradoxes of higher-order (...) vagueness, while in Section VII, I explore a possible line of response to such paradoxes given by Keefe [2000]. In Section VIII, I assess whether which Shapiro might adapt Keefe's response to combat both paradoxes. (shrink)

After a brief account of the problem of higher-order vagueness, and its seeming intractability, I explore what comes of the issue on a linguistic, contextualist account of vagueness. On the view in question, predicates like ‘borderline red’ and ‘determinately red’ are, or at least can be, vague, but they are different in kind from ‘red’. In particular, ‘borderline red’ and ‘determinately red’ are not colours. These predicates have linguistic components, and invoke notions like ‘competent user of the language’. On my (...) view, so-called ‘higher-order vagueness’ is actually ordinary, first-order vagueness in different predicates. I explore the possibility that, nevertheless, a pernicious regress ensues. (shrink)

To get to grips with what Shapiro does and can say about higher-order vagueness, it is first necessary to thoroughly review and evaluate his conception of (first-order) vagueness, a conception which is both rich and suggestive but, as it turns out, not so easy to stabilise. In Sections I–IV, his basic position on vagueness (see Shapiro [2003]) is outlined and assessed. As we go along, I offer some suggestions for improvement. In Sections V–VI, I review two key paradoxes of higher-order (...) vagueness, while in Section VII, I explore a possible line of response to such paradoxes given by Keefe [2000]. In Section VIII, I assess whether which Shapiro might adapt Keefe's response to combat both paradoxes. (shrink)

Contemporary debates over the appropriate balance of unilateralism and multilateralism in U.S. foreign policy reflect disagreements not simply about the practical effectiveness of these alternative options but also about their legitimacy. Advocates of multilateral and unilateral action alike tend to bundle prudential calculations with normative claims, making assessments about costs and benefits difficult to disentangle from ethical arguments about fairness, justice, morality and obligation. Greater clarity may be possible by classifying U.S. foreign policy into six analytical categories, based on whether (...) the aims pursued are nationalist, internationalist, or cosmopolitan and the strategies adopted to realize them are unilateral or multilateral. Each set of aims has different ethical justifications that generate and help to explain divergent attitudes and judgments about the role of multilateral cooperation in U.S. foreign policy. The article sheds new light on alleged U.S. unilateralism, showing that the U.S. decision to go it alone–or to act with others–can be motivated by the desire to advance the narrow interests of the United States, to advance the interests of all states, or to advance the interests of humanity at large. The article suggests that purely nationalist policies, whether pursued through unilateral or multilateral means, will become increasingly untenable and illegitimate as world politics becomes institutionalized and as humanity becomes integrated, albeit slowly, into a single cosmopolitan community. (shrink)

After a brief account of the problem of higher-order vagueness, and its seeming intractability, I explore what comes of the issue on a linguistic, contextualist account of vagueness. On the view in question, predicates like 'borderline red' and 'determinately red' are, or at least can be, vague, but they are different in kind from 'red'. In particular, 'borderline red' and 'determinately red' are not colours. These predicates have linguistic components, and invoke notions like 'competent user of the language'. On my (...) view, so-called 'higher-order vagueness' is actually ordinary, first-order vagueness in different predicates. I explore the possibility that, nevertheless, a pernicious regress ensues. (shrink)

Efforts to identify antecedents of employee turnover are likely to offer value to organizations through money saved on recruitment and new-hire training. The authors utilized the stakeholder perspective to corporate social responsibility to examine the effects of a perceived climate for ethics on the relationship between diversity climate and voluntary turnover intentions. Specifically, they examined how ethics climate (employees' perceptions that their organization values and enforces ethically correct behavior) affected the diversity climate-turnover intentions relationship. Results indicated that ethics climate moderated (...) the diversity climateturnover intentions relationship. Turnover intentions were lowest among workers perceiving both a prodiversity and highly ethical climate. These results reinforce the need to communicate both diversity values and ethical standards to employees. (shrink)

For almost twenty years, Penelope Maddy has been one of the most consistent expositors and advocates of naturalism in philosophy, with a special focus on the philosophy of mathematics, set theory in particular. Over that period, however, the term ‘naturalism’ has come to mean many things. Although some take it to be a rejection of the possibility of a priori knowledge, there are philosophers calling themselves ‘naturalists’ who willingly embrace and practice an a priori methodology, not a whole lot different (...) from traditional conceptual analysis. Along a different line, some take naturalism to involve the rejection of abstract objects—a sort of physicalism—while other naturalists not only allow the existence of abstracta; they take this existence to be all but obvious.For present purposes, we can begin with W.V.O. Quine, who once characterized naturalism as ‘the abandonment of the goal of first philosophy’ and ‘the recognition that it is within science itself …that reality is to be identified and described’. For Quine, the ‘naturalistic philosopher begins his reasoning within the inherited world theory as a going concern …[The] inherited world theory is primarily a scientific one, the current product of the scientific enterprise’ [Quine, 1981, p. 72]. This characterizes at least the bulk of contemporary philosophers who call themselves ‘naturalists’, and it characterizes the targets of many who oppose what they call ‘naturalism’. But as Maddy notes at the start, ‘the term has come to mark little more than a vague science-friendliness’.An attempt to define naturalism more fully would surely require a characterization of science—at least so that the reader can see when someone sins against that naturalism by being unscientific. But, as Maddy notes, one ‘lesson won through decades of study in the philosophy of science [is that] there is no …. (shrink)

Autism is a group of complex neurodevelopmental disorders characterized by impaired social interaction and restricted/repetitive behavior. We performed a large-scale retrospective analysis of 1,996 clinical neurological structural magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) examinations of 781 autistic and 988 control subjects (aged 0 to 32 years), and extracted regionally distributed cortical thickness measurements, including average measurements as well as standard deviations which supports the assessment of intra-regional cortical thickness variability. The youngest autistic participants (< 2.5 years) were diagnosed after imaging and were (...) identified retrospectively. The largest effect sizes and the most common findings not previously published in the scientific literature involve abnormal intra-regional variability in cortical thickness affecting many (but not all) regions of the autistic brain, suggesting irregular gray matter development in autism that can be detected with MRI. Atypical developmental patterns have been detected as early as 0 years old in individuals who would later be diagnosed with autism. (shrink)

This book presents a collection of contemporary discourses that reconsider the relationship of democracy as a political ideology and American ideal and education as the foundation of preparing democratic citizens in America.

This book examines cultural recognition and the struggle for identity in America's schools. In particular, the contributing authors focus on the recognition and misrecognition as antagonistic cultural forces that work to shape, and at times distort identity.

To get to grips with what Shapiro does and can say about higher-order vagueness, it is first necessary to thoroughly review and evaluate his conception of (first-order) vagueness, a conception which is both rich and suggestive but, as it turns out, not so easy to stabilise. In Sections I–IV, his basic position on vagueness (see Shapiro [2003]) is outlined and assessed. As we go along, I offer some suggestions for improvement. In Sections V–VI, I review two key paradoxes of higher-order (...) vagueness, while in Section VII, I explore a possible line of response to such paradoxes given by Keefe [2000]. In Section VIII, I assess whether which Shapiro might adapt Keefe's response to combat both paradoxes. (shrink)

This richly textured book bridges analytic and hermeneutic and phenomenological philosophy of science. It features unique resources for students of the philosophy and history of quantum mechanics and the Copenhagen Interpretation, cognitive theory and the psychology of perception, the history and philosophy of art, and the pragmatic and historical relationships between religion and science.

00 Drawing on the phenomenological tradition in the philosophy of science and philosophy of nature, Patrick Heelan concludes that perception is a cognitive, ...

Why a hermeneutical philosophy of the natural sciences? It is necessary to address the philosophic crisis of realism vs relativism in the natural sciences. This crisis is seen as a part of the cultural crisis that Husserl and Heidegger identified and attributed to the hegemonic role of theoretical and calculative thought in Western societies. The role of theory is addressed using the hermeneutical circle to probe the origin of theoretic meaning in scientific cultural praxes. This is studied in Galileo's discovery (...) of the phases of Venus; the practice of measurement; the different theories and practices of space perception; the historicality and temporality of scientific research communities which ground paradigm change; and the process of discovery. The paper draws particularly from the work of Heidegger. Though envisaging all science and scholarship, the highlighted theme is research in the natural sciences. (shrink)

. How does the doctrine of double effect apply to business decisions to sell products which may be harmful to consumers? Lawrence Masek believes that some authors have misapplied the doctrine to this type of decision and, as a consequence, have committed themselves to placing unwarranted constraints on businesses. Seeking to correct this mistake, Masek presents his account of how the doctrine applies here, an account which is rather permissive but which, he claims, nevertheless preserves the virtues of the doctrine. (...) It will be seen, though, that his attempt to loosen these putatively unnecessary constraints by appealing to consumer autonomy and an intuition about the morality of producing harmful products leaves the doctrine of double effect irrelevant to this type of decision. His argument that the doctrine is less restrictive in this context than others suppose leads ultimately to the conclusion that the doctrine does not constrain this kind of business decision at all. (shrink)

Agnosticism has been largely passed over in the literature on Theism. This paper lays out an affirmative case for the agnostic position. Tapping into the classical arguments about the paradoxical qualities of ‘omni’ principles it argues that the agnostic position is ultimately more tenable than either Theism or Atheism. In the first part it regards the paradoxes of omnipotence and their replies strictly logically, declaring them to be true antimonies. In the second part it argues that classic arguments for belief (...) before proof run afoul of additional paradoxes and require the rejection of the most basic logical principles to accept. (shrink)

The fundamental constants and initial conditions of the universe seem "finely tuned" for human habitation. The anthropic principle attempts to explain this fine tuning in terms of the eventual development of intelligent life. A closer look at the principle’s explanandum, however, reveals that it is teleologically and anthropocentrically biased. Our ignorance of the physical requirements of nonhuman forms of life forces the principle to be more unjustifiably anthropocentric and more speculative than is commonly admitted. Leslie’s, Barrow’s and Tipler’s attempts to (...) avoid an overly anthropocentric anthropic principle fail to solve these problems. (shrink)

Context: Most constructivist discourse is situated at the philosophical-conceptual level, where arguments appeal to the intuition of the reader, while formal-computational models have only been taken into account to a very limited degree so far. Problem: Two types of problems need to be addressed: Synthetically, can constructivist concepts be turned into actual computational implementations? Can these be further conceptual developments in constructivist theory as such, or are they just an application thereof? Conceptually, does the notion of computation square with constructivist (...) approaches at all? Method: Paradigmatically, we discuss the meaning of “computational” in cognitive agents that comply with constructivist concepts. Also, we summarize the contributions. Results: From a constructivist point of view, the concept of “computational model” is ambiguous and depends on whether it is used in the sense of the computational(ist) theory of mind or simply as a tool. Implications: The insights presented in the contributions to this special issue point in the direction of a computational extension of constructivist approaches as well as a constructivist extension to computational approaches. However, while many of the questions we posed were discussed in the contributions and open peer commentaries, some of them were largely neglected and thus are subject to further discussion. (shrink)

The aim of this dissertation is to develop a theory of hope which accounts for the two senses in which hoping is, or should be, practical. The first sense concerns the need to make hopes realizable, while the second captures hope's ability to sustain us and foster growth. My argument is that a pragmatic theory of hope, previously undeveloped, provides a compelling explanation of hope's practicality. In particular, such a theory emphasizes three dimensions of the life of hope--particular hopes, habits (...) of hope, and hopefulness--the interweaving of which accounts for hope's practicality. ;In the Introduction, I discuss the need for a practical theory of hope and then sketch key pragmatic ideas used throughout the dissertation. These include pragmatism's commitment to contextualism as well as the means-end continuum. In Chapters I and II, I discuss the first sense of hope's practicality, i.e., its realizability. I situate hope in the context of the human being as an interactive biological organism, highlighting the roles of intelligence and habits, as well as that of the self understood as the reconstructive dynamic of the organism. I then discuss particular hopes by focusing on their ends, understood as future goods which are arduous but nevertheless possible to realize. Chapter II focuses on habits of hope as the primary means to the realization of particular hopes. I consider three such habits, persistence, resourcefulness, and courage. ;Habits of hope also play an important role in the development of hopefulness. In Chapter III, I discuss the nature of hopefulness, contrasting it with despair and examining how it contributes to the second sense of hope's practicality. I argue that we can develop hopefulness as the regnant habit of the self, nurturing and sustaining us as we meet life's trials. The social nature of hopefulness is emphasized through examples drawn from Stephen King's "Rita Hayworth and the Shawshank Redemption" and John Steinbeck's The Grapes of Wrath. Both works show how hopefulness develops through close interpersonal relationships. ;Chapter IV closes the discussion by highlighting the conditioned nature of hope, pragmatically conceived. I consider alternate theories which focus on unconditioned hopes, but argue that these theories undermine hope's practicality. They transform its conditioned transcendence into an unconditioned transcendence, thereby undermining hope's realizability. (shrink)

IN A recent work I have attempted to show that visual space tends to have a Euclidean geometrical structure only when the environment is filled with a repetitive pattern of regularly faceted objects carpentered to exhibit simple standard Euclidean shapes, and tends to have a hyperbolic structure when vision is deprived of these clues. I conclude that visual perception--and by analogy, all perception--is hermeneutic as well as causal: it responds to structures in the flow of optical energy, but the character (...) of its response is also hermeneutical, that is, it has the capacity to "read" the appropriate structures in the World, and to form perceptual judgments of the World about which these "speak." The clues that are "read" perceptually as giving a Euclidean visual space are engineered objects, such as streets and buildings with repetitive architectural elements. These scientific artifacts of human culture belong to a family of readable technologies central to the phenomenological and existential-hermeneutical analysis of natural science. (shrink)

Hermeneutics, or interpretation, is concerned with the generation, transmission, and acceptance of meaning within the lifeworld, and was the original method of the human sciences stemming, from F. Schleiermacher and W. Dilthey. The `hermeneutic philosophy' refers mostly to Heidegger. This paper addresses natural science from the perspective of Heidegger's analysis of meaning and interpretation. Its purpose is to incorporate into the philosophy of science those aspects of historicality, culture, and tradition that are absent from the traditional analysis of theory and (...) explanation, to re-orient the current discussion about scientific realism around the hermeneutics of meaning and truth in science, and to establish some relationship between the current philosophy of natural science and hermeneutical philosophy. The paper has particular relevance to the history and social studies of science and technology. (shrink)

The structure of the universe and of most objects in it is determined by a small number of physical constants. It can be shown that only a limited range of values for each of these constants is compatible with the existence of human life. The fact that we are able to exist--but just barely--calls for an explanation. In the last fifteen years, an "anthropic principle" has been proposed as a possible scientific explanation of the fortuitous features of our world. This (...) type of explanation focuses on ways in which the presence of human beings guarantees that conditions in the early universe be suitable for the eventual development of intelligent life. In its strongest form, the anthropic principle is teleological: the universe is habitable precisely so that humans can evolve in it. ;Many issues surrounding the principle and its role in contemporary cosmology have been widely misunderstood by physicists and philosophers alike. My project is to clarify the nature of the principle and to criticize its value as a scientific claim. In chapters 1 and 2, I discuss the principle's historical background, and differentiate between several distinct ideas often misleadingly categorized as "anthropic." In chapter 3, after considering the principle's scientific justification, I conclude that it is neither essentially anthropic nor capable of predictive success. In chapter 4, I argue that the principle has little, if any, explanatory power, even in its teleological form. Having put fourth a number of criticisms of the principle as a scientific principle, in the final chapter I look at the possibility of construing it in a theistic context. Although the principle is not usually considered a religious principle, its resemblance to premises used in traditional theistic arguments from design suggests that it may be more defensible if thought of in a theistic context. (shrink)

A significant criticism of the anthropic principle as a scientific claim is that testable predictions cannot be derived from it. Brandon Carter has argued, however, that the principle can be used to predict on the one hand that the period of time biological evolution is intrinsically likely to require is very large, and on the other that the number of ‘critical steps’ that have occurred in the evolution of life on earth is related to the length of time life can (...) continue to evolve. I attempt to show that neither of Carter's arguments provides a convincing defence of the testability of the anthropic principle. (shrink)

It has been argued that killing persons is wrong because it deprives them of future experiences. Some opponents of abortion argue that the same apples to potential persons—fetuses, zygotes, embryos, etc.—so that to destroy them is as wrong as killing a person. Phil Gosselin rejects this position, employing the reductio argument that if it were so, contraception would be equally wrong, since it destroys potential persons that are gamete pairs. I argue in this paper that Gosselin’s position on the ontological (...) status of the “victim” of contraception, the gamete pair, is flawed in such a way that his conclusion that there is no morally relevant difference between what is destroyed by abortion and what is destroyed by contraception fails. A gamete pair is ontologically different from a fetus; “victims” of contraception and victims of abortion are not significantly analogous, and the reductio that depends upon their similarity for its force is unsuccessful. (shrink)

Quantum mechanics has raised in an acute form three problems which go to the heart of man's relationship with nature through experimental science: (r) the public objectivity of science, that is, its value as a universal science for all investigators; (2) the empirical objectivity of scientific objects, that is, man's ability to construct a precise or causal spatio-temporal model of microscopic systems; and finally (3), the formal objectivity of science, that is, its value as an expression of what nature is (...) independently of its being an object of human knowledge. These are three aspects of what is generally called the "crisis of objec tivity" or the "crisis of realism" in modern physics. This crisis is. studied in the light of Werner Heisenberg's work. Heisenberg was one of the architects of quantum mechanics, and we have chosen his writings as the principal source-material for this study. Among physicists of the microscopic domain, no one except perhaps Bohr has expressed himself so abundantly and so profoundly on the philosophy of science as Heisenberg. His writings, both technical and non-technical, show an awareness of the mysterious element in scientific knowledge, far from the facile positivism of Bohr and others of his contemporaries. The mystery of human knowledge and human SUbjectivity is for him an abiding source of wonder. (shrink)

Agnosticism has been largely passed over in the literature on Theism. This paper lays out an affirmative case for the agnostic position. Tapping into the classical arguments about the paradoxical qualities of ‘omni’ principles it argues that the agnostic position is ultimately more tenable than either Theism or Atheism. In the first part it regards the paradoxes of omnipotence and their replies strictly logically, declaring them to be true antimonies. In the second part it argues that classic arguments for belief (...) before proof run afoul of additional paradoxes and require the rejection of the most basic logical principles to accept. (shrink)

Patrick Aidan Heelan’s The Observable offers the reader a completely articulated development of his 1965 philosophy of quantum physics, Quantum Mechanics and Objectivity. In this previously unpublished study dating back more than a half a century, Heelan brings his background as both a physicist and a philosopher to his reflections on Werner Heisenberg’s physical philosophy. Including considerably broader connections to the contributions of Niels Bohr, Wolfgang Pauli, and Albert Einstein, this study also reflects Heelan’s experience in Eugene Wigner’s laboratory (...) at Princeton along with his reflections on working with Erwin Schrödinger dating from Heelan’s years at the Institute for Advanced Cosmology in Dublin. A contribution to continental philosophy of science, the phenomenological and hermeneutic resources applied in this book to the physical and ontological paradoxes of quantum physics, especially in connection with laboratory science and measurement, theory and model making, will enrich students of the history of science as well as those interested in different approaches to the historiography of science. University courses in the philosophy of physics will find this book indispensable as a resource and invaluable for courses in the history of science. (shrink)

Husserl argues in the Crisis that the prevalent tradition of positive science in his time had a philosophical core, called by him "Galilean science", that mistook the quest for objective theory with the quest for truth. Husserl is here referring to Gottingen science of the Golden Years. For Husserl, theory "grows" out of the "soil" of the prescientific, that is, pretheoretical, life-world. Scientific truth finally is to be sought not in theory but rather in the pragmatic-perceptual praxes of measurement. Husserl (...) is faulted for taking measuring processes to be "infinitely perfectible". The dependence of new scientific phenomena on the existence of prior "prescientific" inductive praxis is analyzed, also Husserl's residual objectivism and failure to appreciate the hermeneutic character of measurement. Though not a scientific (theory-)realist, neither was he an instrumentalist, but he was a scientific (phenomena-)realist. (shrink)

My scientific field is theoretical physics. My philosophical orientation is phenomenology, especially hermeneutical phenomenology, as modified and extended under the influence of Bernard Lonergan's cognitional theory. In fact, I was already deeply under the influence of Bernard Lonergan's workbefore I went to Louvain/Leuven to study phenomenology as a propaedeutic to my preparation in the philosophy of science. The specific topic of this paper is one close to the center of Philip's interest, namely, to articulate the right balance among theory, experiment, (...) and what Husserl called 'die Sache selbst' or the 'givenness' of scientific objects as experienced and understood. The method I shall adopt is that of Husserl's phenomenology of perception, as modified by Lonergan's method of 'self-appropriation.' I will be concerned then with the 'constitution' of experimental data in science - any science. (shrink)

Does the contemporary Natural Law position that only heterosexual couples are capable of marriage rest upon an “arbitrary and irrational distinction between same-sex couples and sterile heterosexual couples?” Anderson :759–775, 2013: 759). There are many who think so. In a recent article in these pages, Erik Anderson offers his case that these critics are correct. In what follows I examine Anderson’s argument and conclude that, whether or not one ultimately agrees with the New Natural Law account of marriage, the distinction (...) found there between same sex couples and sterile heterosexual couples is neither arbitrary nor irrational. (shrink)

This syllabus was submitted to the Rhodes College Office of Academic Affairs by the course instructor.

This syllabus was submitted to the Rhodes College Office of Academic Affairs by the course instructor.

This syllabus was submitted to the Rhodes College Office of Academic Affairs by the course instructor.

This syllabus was submitted to the Rhodes College Office of Academic Affairs by the course instructor.

This syllabus was submitted to the Rhodes College Office of Academic Affairs by the course instructor.

This syllabus was submitted to the Rhodes College Office of Academic Affairs by the course instructor.

This syllabus was submitted to the Rhodes College Office of Academic Affairs by the course instructor.

This syllabus was submitted to the Rhodes College Office of Academic Affairs by the course instructor.

This syllabus was submitted to the Rhodes College Office of Academic Affairs by the course instructor.

Heisenberg, in constructing quantum mechanics, explicitly followed certain principles exemplified, as he believed, in Einstein's construction of the special theory of relativity which for him was the paradigm for radical theoretic change in physics. These were the principles of scientific realism, stability of background knowledge, E-observability, contextual re-interpretation, pragmatic continuity, model continuity, simplicity. Fifty years later, in retrospect, Heisenberg added the following two: a principle of non-proliferation of competing theories - scientific revolutions are not a legitimate goal of physics - (...) and a principle of tenacity - existing theories are to be conserved as far as possible. The conservative as well as the revolutionary potential of these principles is then discussed. A more penetrating philosophical criticism of these principles is postponed. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Decision-Making as a Broader ConceptJacinta O. A. Tan (bio), Anne Stewart (bio), and Tony Hope (bio)KeywordsCompetence, decision-making, capacity, anorexia nervosa, autonomy, values, identityWe thank Demian Whiting for the thoughtful critique of aspects of our paper (Tan et al. 2006a). A primary aim of our research was to provide empirical grounds on which to stimulate discussion about the nature of decision-making capacity (DMC). Whiting criticizes in particular the concept (...) of 'pathological values' that we suggested might be relevant in the assessment of DMC and in the related issue of deciding when a patient's refusal of beneficial treatment should be overridden.Whiting's central concern is with DMC. Whiting argues that the absence of pathological values should not be a criterion for DMC. We are unclear whether he is also arguing that pathological values do not provide a reason of any kind for overriding treatment refusal. At the end of the paper he writes: "we cannot justify compulsory treatment of patients who have pathological values... on the grounds that these patients lack DMC" (2009, XX). This seems to leave open the possibility that we may be able to justify compulsory treatment of patients who have pathological values on grounds other than that they lack DMC. As we wrote in our response to the discussants of our original paper, "The primary issue for us is whether the reasons for refusal to which we draw attention provide grounds for overriding refusal, and if they do how they can be characterized in such a way as to avoid the ever-present danger of simply overriding autonomy in a patient's best interests" (Tan et al. 2006b, 300).In deciding on whether to use compulsory treatment, there are other relevant factors that may need to be considered, such as the seriousness of the decision, which determines the threshold for competence. However, in this response we consider three issues. First, we argue that the current concept of DMC is by no means so clear cut or generally agreed upon as Whiting implies, and that some of the lack of clarity relates to pathological values. Second, that the concept of DMC is itself dependent on accounts of autonomy, and that it is plausible that pathological values can affect autonomy. Third, we directly consider the question of whether a coherent account of pathological values might be given based on a concept of authenticity.The Current Criteria for DMCWhiting argues that the current criteria for DMC are correct and that an additional criterion along the lines of absence of pathological values should not be added. This argument assumes that there is a clear and agreed understanding of the current criteria. We believe this is not the case for three reasons.(i) Whiting begins his account of DMC by saying that it is normally taken to include: "(1) [End Page 345] understanding (and appreciation)" (2009, 341). Already there is an area of dispute, and the use of parentheses reflects this. The concept of 'appreciation' was developed by Grisso and Applebaum (Grisso, Appelbaum, and Hill-Fotouhi 1997). It is not included in either English common law development, for example (ReC), nor in the criteria specified in the Mental Capacity Act 2005. More important, Grisso and Appelbaum in their comment on our original paper (2006) argue that our work advances thinking about 'appreciation' rather than requiring that we add new elements. The implication is that they believe that what we have called pathological values are relevant to the assessment of capacity and are already included in an account of capacity that incorporates the criterion of 'appreciation.' In our response, we argued that pathological values are not entirely captured within the account of appreciation that Grisso and Appelbaum had previously given. We do not want to revisit that issue here, but the point of relevance is that on one view (that of Grisso and Appelbaum) pathological values are already included in the current criteria for DMC as part of the concept of appreciation, whereas on Whiting's view they are not.(ii) Even if there were agreement over the wording and concepts relevant to DMC there is a further important issue: how are those concepts... (shrink)

Hermeneutics, or interpretation, is concerned with the generation, transmission, and acceptance of meaning within the lifeworld, and was the original method of the human sciences stemming, from F. Schleiermacher and W. Dilthey. The `hermeneutic philosophy' refers mostly to Heidegger. This paper addresses natural science from the perspective of Heidegger's analysis of meaning and interpretation. Its purpose is to incorporate into the philosophy of science those aspects of historicality, culture, and tradition that are absent from the traditional analysis of theory and (...) explanation, to re-orient the current discussion about scientific realism around the hermeneutics of meaning and truth in science, and to establish some relationship between the current philosophy of natural science and hermeneutical philosophy. The paper has particular relevance to the history and social studies of science and technology. (shrink)